Introduction. (1) At one extreme overseas bases could be simply places to land bomber crews by parachute. The balance is not automatic. I know in fact of no high confidence way of avoiding enormous damage to our cities in a war initiated by an aggressor with a surprise thermonuclear attack. The balance of power is one of the oldest and most fundamental concepts in international relations theory. 2 The Integrated Process Model. III-Realism in the US Foreign Policy. (3) They might support the landing of tankers after they have fueled the bombers and so permit the transfer of larger amounts of fuel. Balance of power refers to the concept of power, or military might, being evenly distributed among a variety of states. For example, five half-megaton weapons with an average accuracy of 2 miles might be expected to destroy half the population of a city of 900,000, spread over 40 square miles, provided the inhabitants are without shelters. After Trek: Choose Your Pain (2017) (TV Episode) Mark Lenard 's roles in TOS are mentioned in the trivia part of the show. Such a plan is worthless for discovering a well prepared attack with ICBMs or submarine-launched missiles or a routine mass training flight whose destination could be kept ambiguous. Though deterrence is not enough in itself, it is vital. For the complex job of deterrence, they all have limitations. It is only when one side of a conflict is so powerful, so wealthy, and so militarily … Here, Polaris, the combat air patrol of B-52's, and in fact all of the mobile platforms -- under water, on the surface, in the air and above the air — have severe problems. The complexities of the problem, if they were more widely understood, would discourage the oracular confidence of writers on the subject of deterrence. The increased readiness of strategic forces affects the disarmament issues and therefore our allies and the neutral powers. Some touch down overseas will remain useful to most U.S. bombers, which will make up the greater part of the deterrent force in the early Sixties. Since retiring in 1970, he wrote and did research with his wife. Balance of power accepts armament race as a natural phenomenon, balance of terror seeks to limit or maintain a particular low level in armament race. It is a curious paradox of our recent intellectual history that, among the pioneers of both the balance of terror theory of automatic deterrence and the small nuclear weapon theory of limited or tactical war were the last true believers in the possibility of near perfect defense — which would have made deterrence infeasible and both it and the ability to fight limited war unimportant. The alternative was to launch bombers on their way to target with instructions to continue unless recalled. But in the case of an enemy ballistic missile attack is most illuminating. Massive retaliation against even minor threats, since it exposed us to no danger, might be credible. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. These matters are wildly uncertain; we are talking about weapons and vehicles that are some time off and, even if the precise performances currently hoped for and claimed by contractors were in the public domain, it would be a good idea to doubt them. 1. A sober analysis of Soviet choice from the standpoint of Soviet interest and the technical alternatives, and taking into account the uncertainties that a Russian planner would insure against, suggests that we must expect a vast increase in the weight of attack which the Soviets can deliver with little warning, and the growth of a significant Russian capability for an essentially warningless attack. This report is part of the RAND Corporation paper series. The fifth hurdle is the aggressor's long-range interceptors and close-in missile defenses. How much the Soviets will risk in surprise attack will depend in part on the vulnerability of our future posture. (This calculation takes account of the unreliability and inaccuracy of the missile.) These are the choices that determine whether a weapons system will have any genuine capability in the realistic circumstances of a war. if the alarm is false, the bombers will return to base even if there is a failure in radio communications. I shall have occasion to comment briefly on the defects of most of these measures taken singly. Such deterrent systems must have (a) a stable, "steady-state" peacetime operation within feasible budgets (besides the logistic and operational costs that are, for example, problem of false alarms and accidents). [Ship's Chapel] SCOTT: The ceremony will be carried on all viewing screens, sir. Because there is not much space for obtaining warning — in any case, there are no deep-warning radar nets — and, since most of our overseas bases are close to deep water from which submarines might launch missiles, the warning problem is very much more severe than for bases in the interior of the United States. “Balance of Terror”: Star Trek, History, and National Security “Star Trek meets Van Gogh” by Aja Apa-Soura. We pointed out the essential role of quick response and a high degree of readiness in the protection of the deterrent force. "Extinction" is a state that badly needs analysis. Or, looked at another way, for a fixed budget this means a smaller number of bombers capable of operating from far off than from close in to Russia. First, even if we can deter general war b… Plagiarism Prevention 4. I know of no convincing evidence that tactical nuclear weapons favor the defender rather than the aggressor if both sides use such weapons. New York: Wiley. The balance of power is one of the oldest and most fundamental concepts in international relations theory. Finally, even with advances in the state-of-the-art on our side, it will continue to be hard to maintain a deterrent, and even harder close in under the enemy's guns than further off. But perhaps, as a small aid toward making such decisions more likely, we should contemplate the possibility that they may not be made. There are two principal points. [8] Mr. Blackett's recent book, Atomic Weapons and East-West Relations, illustrates the hazards confronting a most able analyst in dealing with the piecemeal information available to the general public. I must confess that the picture of the world that I have presented is unpleasant. It is, moreover, only an average, admitting variance down as well as up. We all get scared of the fatality of human life, but the Terror Management Theory may be affecting you more than you realize. Prohibited Content 3. It remains to be seen whether there are any equilibrium points between the use of conventional and all-out weapons. Mr. Rovere's example is plausible because it assumes implicitly that the defender's hydrogen bombs will with certainty be visited on the aggressor; then the damage done by the ten bombs seems terrible enough for deterrence, and any more would be simply redundant. They have a variety of military, political and economic roles which are beyond the scope of this paper. Some of the proposals for bombardment satellites may involve such hazards of unintended bomb release as to make them out of the question. For example, the estimated cost of one missile increased by a factor of over 50 — from about $35,000 in 1949 to some $2 million in 1957. none, 1958. Let me suggest at this point the inadequacy of the popular conception of the airborne alert — an extreme form of defense by mobility. But it would be a fatal mistake to confuse the inadequacy of strategic deterrence with its dispensability. Some increase in the number of armed bombers aloft is to be expected. The use of nuclear weapons in limited wars might make it possible for the aggressor to eliminate the existing forces of the defender and to get the war over, reaching his limited objective before the defender or his allies can mobilize new forces. The proponents do not seem to regard an addition of capability for NATO at the all-out end of the spectrum as the required broadening; but if they do, they are faced with the question previously considered: the actuality of this all-out response under all-out attack. Is mutual extinction the only outcome of a general war? Or, taking a specific bomber with a fixed radius, the cost of extending its radius by buying and operating aerial tankers will also grow at an increasing rate, with additional air refuelings to extend radius. If the picture of the world I have drawn is rather bleak, it could nonetheless be cataclysmically worse. In a clear sense the great multiplication and spread of nuclear arms throughout the world, the drastic increase in the degree of readiness of these weapons, and the decrease in the time available for the decision on their use must inevitably raise the risk of accident. And we should ask at the very least whether further expansion of this policy will buy as much retaliatory power as other ways of spending the considerable sums involved. But there would be enormous differences in costs between distant and close-in repeated delivery at a given rate of high explosives. Such a weapon is inappropriate for even the nuclear variety of limited war, and it is totally useless for meeting the wide variety of provocation that is well below the threshold of nuclear response. This is clearly an important hurdle in the early Sixties. many sensitive and serious critics of Western defense policy have expressed their deep dissatisfaction with the strategy of deterrence. The many critics of the massive retaliation policy who advocate a capability to meet limited aggression with a limited response are on firm ground in suggesting that a massive response on such an occasion would be unlikely and the threat to use it therefore not believed. Before publishing your articles on this site, please read the following pages: 1. In the case of the first four, an attack on the base would not prevent the fulfillment by the bomber of at least a single mission of retaliation. The Atlas, Titan, and Polaris rockets, when available, can of course do without overseas bases. AFK Organski has pointed out the following similarities and dissimilarities between the two: 1. B.H. Political realism, as opposed to idealism, is mistakenly sometimes believed to be a theory that flourished during the modern times. The most important of these is the definition of security. What can we say then, in sum, on the balance of terror theory of automatic deterrence? Criticism of the Theory A great deal of criticism of the democratic peace theory is focused on methodology. That's not the world we live in today. But none of the new developments in vehicles is likely to do that. The cost to buy and operate various weapons systems must be seriously considered. Mr. Alsop recently enunciated as one of the four rules of nuclear war: "The aggressor's problem is astronomically difficult; and the aggressor requires an overwhelming superiority of force. I hope these illustrations will suggest that assuring ourselves the power to strike back after a massive thermonuclear surprise attack is by no means as automatic as is widely believed. Unfortunately, both the privileged and unprivileged information on these matters is precarious. There can be electronic or mechanical failures of the sort illustrated by the B-47 and Nike mishaps; there can be aberrations of individuals, perhaps, quite low in the echelon of command; and, finally, there can be miscalculations on the part of governments as to enemy intent and the meaning of ambiguous signals. (However, (a) this can't be very persuasively argued as the justification for the IRBMs since they will add few if any new political entities to our current manned aircraft base system which would have to be attacked by the Russians in order to destroy our bombers; and, as we shall discuss, (b) where location in a foreign country means joint control, we may not be able to use the base in retaliation.) Mr. Kennan, for example, rejects the bomb as salvation, but explicitly grants it a sorry value as a deterrent. And the aggressor has, among other enormous advantages of the first strike, the ability to weigh continually our performance at each of the six barriers and to choose a precise known time and circumstance for attack which will reduce uncertainty. Here again is an instance of Western-preferred Soviet strategies, this time applied to limited war. Deterrence is a matter of comparative risks. The estimate of 50 million deaths in the Second World War includes some 20 million Soviet citizens and an estimated six million Jews and two to three million others killed in Nazi concentration camps. My previous comments have suggested that warning against both manned bomber and ballistic or cruise missile attack is most difficult overseas in areas close to the enemy. Another argument, which will not hold water and which is in fact dangerous, is sometimes used: Little wars are likely, general war improbable. In the last year or two there has been a growing awareness of the importance of the distinction between a "strike-first" and a "strike-second" capability, but little, if any, recognition of the implications of this distinction for the balance of terror theory. It would tend to provoke rather than to deter general war. He spent ten years working and teaching at a clinic in Massachussets, and ten years more back at Harvard. "Balance of Terror" is the fourteenth episode of the first season of the American science fiction television series, Star Trek. The "thousands of coordinated air sorties and/or missile firings," he concludes, are not feasible. Despite the overwhelming consensus among scientists that anthropogenic (human-caused) climate change is real, the public has remained relatively unmoved. Third, an analysis can throw some light on the problems faced by our allies in developing an independent ability to deter all-out attack on themselves and in this way it can clarify the much agitated question of nuclear sharing. More important, they are likely to be used as an excuse for budget cutting. Yet I would conjecture that if one considers the implications of modern surface-to-air missiles in the context of conventional war in which the attacker has to make many sorties and expose himself to recurring attrition, these weapons would look ever so much better than they do when faced, for example, with the heroic task of knocking down 99 percent of a wave of, say one thousand nuclear bombers. But in recent years with the sudden disappearance of the Soviet Union, growing power of the United States, and increasing prominence of international institutions many scholars have argued that balance of power theory is losing its relevance. Papers were less formal than reports and did not require rigorous peer review. For close-in targets the Soviets can use a larger variety of weapons carrying larger payloads and with improved accuracies. The state-of-the-art during the past decade or so has been such that this has meant a drastic rise in costs at distances less than those from bases well within the United States to targets well within Russia. General deterrence and the balance of power - Volume 15 Issue 2 - Lawrence Freedman. (2) Or they might provide emergency landing facilities for the bombers returning from target. The errors were large and almost always in one direction. systems which depend for their survival on extreme decentralization of controls, as may be the case with large scale dispersal and some of the mobile weapons, raise problems of accidents and over a long period of peacetime operation this leads in turn to serious political problems. Thus the “balance of power” was an important adjunct to European ideologies that rejected universal empire on normative grounds. Indeed if there were no real danger of a rational attack, then accidents and the "n-th" country problem seem the only problems. However, some of the principal conclusions about deterrence in the early Sixties can be fairly firmly based, and based on public information. 2. Unfortunately, the minor powers have smaller resources as well as poorer strategic locations. Critics point out that traditional balance of power theory fails to explain state behavior in the post-Cold War era. Or getting through may involve carrying heavy loads of radar decoys, electronic jammers and other aids to defense penetration. Both involve the acceptance of such national policies which are in reality dangerous and risky. In consequence, the discussion will be advanced if a little more precision is given such terms as "missiles" or "modern" or "advanced weapons." 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